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When legal scholars and advocates think about the intersection of law
and social science, particularly in the areas of equal protection and civil
rights, many think of Brown v. Board of Education.1 Brown is often
considered the most prominent and influential use of social science evidence
in a legal decision. The Supreme Court directly cited multiple social science
research articles in the now (in)famous2 footnote,3 briefly validating
researchers and the social science evidence they presented as relevant to
judicial decision-making and general jurisprudence. But any hope generated
by Brown’s recognition of this evidence was subsequently dashed.4 The
debate about the relevance of social science evidence in the courtroom has
waged on in cases involving both constitutional and statutory law, often
fought out in highly contentious cases where the social science findings
demonstrating gender bias in the workplace or racial bias in the criminal
justice system run into hurdles when applied to specific plaintiffs or
defendants in particular cases—a tension both exemplified and exacerbated
by the Supreme Court’s handling of the social science evidence of racial bias
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347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., Michael Heise, Judicial Decision-Making, Social Science Evidence, and Equal
Educational Opportunity: Uneasy Relations and Uncertain Futures, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 864,
867–69 (2008).
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in the application of the death penalty at the center of McCleskey v. Kemp.5
In recognition of the thirtieth anniversary of the McCleskey decision, the
Northwestern University Law Review and an esteemed group of scholars,
attorneys, and judges gathered to discuss the legacy of the Supreme Court’s
treatment of social science in that case in order to examine the future of law’s
relationship with social science evidence. This Symposium Issue collects
their words and contemplates this legacy.
This Symposium was spearheaded by a collective of scholars working
at the intersection of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and empirical studies in
the social sciences, known as the empirical Critical Race Theory (eCRT)
working group.6 They first came together in 2010 after recognizing an
opportunity to build a new generation of scholarship at the intersection of
race and the law that combines traditional critical race perspectives and
social science methods. CRT has offered remarkable insights into the way
that law and society construct race and racial ideologies as well as the
oppressive power of the seemingly objective language of law. CRT has
offered doctrinal critiques, first-person narratives, and other theoretical
deconstructions that expose the law as a racialized tool of power.7 Yet, even
CRT has struggled to blend a critical legal perspective with social science
methodologies and concepts. The eCRT working group comprises race and
identity scholars—some traditional CRT legal scholars, some social
scientists, some who are both—who take an approach to studying race and
the law that embraces the theoretical insights of CRT and the measurement
tools offered by social science methods. By bringing these fields together,
eCRT tries to leverage the descriptive power of the social sciences and the
theoretical and normative clarity of CRT to offer a new vision for race
scholarship and legal practice.
Much work remains to be done to reconcile the relationship between
social science and law, as evinced on the small scale through tensions
highlighted in the creation of eCRT and on the large scale through
developments in equal protection and statutory doctrines over the last several
decades. That continued negotiation is occurring in the shadow of
McCleskey, as well as in Title VII cases like Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,8
decided around the same time as McCleskey, and more recent cases like Wal-
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Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.9 While notions of disparate impact are cognizable
under Title VII (unlike equal protection claims) and courts are open to the
use of social science evidence for support, these employment law cases, and
many more lesser-known decisions, reveal the struggle to apply empirical
evidence in the courtroom and raise questions about the relevance of all
social science data. McCleskey is largely known as a critical death penalty
case that drew attention to the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. But it
was the Court’s treatment of the social science evidence about racial
disparities in the death penalty sentencing that has arguably had the farthest
reaching consequences, both for death penalty litigation and reform and for
other cases involving claims of unconstitutional bias. McCleskey had
profound implications for how courts understand the role of social science
for demonstrating racial discrimination that violates equal protection.
In McCleskey, David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth
presented compelling statistical evidence (the Baldus study)10 to support
Warren McCleskey’s claims that Georgia’s capital sentencing regime
violated equal protection due to racial bias. The Baldus study offered the
Supreme Court evidence that race and racism play a significant role in
determining who receives the death penalty in Georgia. In social science and
reform circles, this study laid the groundwork for increased awareness of
racial disparities in the death penalty, as well as reform efforts such as
Kentucky and North Carolina’s Racial Justice Acts,11 laws meant to allow
consideration of the type of evidence presented in the Baldus study to inform
claims of racial bias in capital sentencing.
How then did the McCleskey Supreme Court weigh the social science
evidence in their decision? Despite their acknowledgement of the study’s
sophisticated methodology,12 they concluded that social science evidence
such as the Baldus study was largely irrelevant to the question of equal
protection because it did not demonstrate intentional discrimination against
the particular plaintiff in front of them: Warren McCleskey.13 They added
that plaintiffs in equal protection cases must identify a discriminatory
purpose such that the defendant acted “because of, not merely in spite of”
some form of racial animosity,14 a doubling down on the intent requirement
9
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For a discussion of both Racial Justice Acts, see Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso,
Confronting Race: How a Confluence of Social Movements Convinced North Carolina to Go Where the
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481 U.S. 279, 286, 327, 337, 341.
13
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for proving discrimination established in Washington v. Davis.15 This had the
effect of reifying a narrow conception of discrimination that focused
primarily on intentional bad actors with specific discriminatory intent that
caused the discrimination in question. But it also rendered social science
evidence of systemic and widespread racial disparities virtually meaningless
in equal protection cases, particularly in cases where the court is faced with
an individual plaintiff or defendant but the social science can only provide
evidence of wider spread phenomena or effects in the aggregate.
In Title VII cases like Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,16 decided only two
years after McCleskey, the Court was clearly influenced by the expert
testimony on gender stereotypes. The Supreme Court decided the case for
the plaintiff and accepted a new legal theory of sex discrimination that
explicitly incorporated gender stereotypes as a basis for legally cognizable
sex discrimination. But even in that case, where the Court appeared more
open to social science evidence than when equal protection claims were
presented, the Court dismissed the social science evidence they clearly
engaged with as simply “icing on [the] cake.”17 Thus, McCleskey showed a
Court that was reluctant to engage the social science evidence because, in
part, the Justices could not understand how it translated to the constitutional
question before them. And even when social science evidence may apply to
cases raising statutory issues, courts are often unsure of what weight or
credit, if any, to assign it. Instead, they often view the social science as, at
best, confirming the courts’ intuitions about the world, making it
commonsense “icing on the cake” rather than fundamentally helpful to the
factfinders.18
If we jump to the 2011 Title VII decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,19 where the Supreme Court denied class certification of 1.5 million
women employed at Walmart, we see persistence in courts’ reluctance to use
social science evidence to frame and understand the social contexts of
discrimination cases. Laurens Walker and John Monahan named this
particular use of social science evidence “social framework” testimony.20
The social science expert in Dukes described his expertise as social
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426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a comprehensive assessment of the intent doctrine’s evolution, see Ian
Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).
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490 U.S. 228 (1989).
17
Id. at 256.
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Id. (dismissing Susan Fiske, the social science expert, as not offering anything that requires
“special training to discern”).
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564 U.S. 338 (2011).
20
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law,
73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
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framework analysis,21 and he offered his opinion, based largely on the social
science theories of stereotyping and bias, that Walmart had a company
culture that was vulnerable to gender bias and discrimination. The Supreme
Court rejected his testimony completely, concluding that because he could
not answer the ultimate question of how often stereotypes or bias might have
played a role in producing the alleged discrimination at the center of the case,
the Court could “safely disregard” his opinion.22 Because social framework
testimony provides context for factfinders to understand broad phenomena
such as implicit bias or stereotyping, rather than answer questions of
causation or other inquiries specific to the particular cases at hand, courts
continue to argue that they cannot generalize from the aggregate effects
demonstrated by social science evidence to even a large class of plaintiffs,
as in Dukes.
This core tension across constitutional and statutory spaces—between
evidence of aggregate effects and general phenomena that social science
offers and the particular application of evidence to individual cases—is
hashed out at every level of the courts, but likely most often at the district
court level. There, we see similar outcomes as the Supreme Court cases
discussed above. For example, in a Title VII race discrimination case decided
this year in the Northern District of Illinois, the home district of the
Northwestern University Law Review, a judge who resisted dismissing social
science evidence on implicit bias and stereotyping outright praised the
evidence as “fascinating” and “powerful” yet ultimately found the social
science nondeterminative for answering the question of whether
discrimination occurred.23 Mirroring, in many ways, the response of the
McCleskey Court, lower courts often deem even persuasive social science
evidence simply not relevant to the case at hand.
The fact that courts, legal advocates, and social scientists continue to
struggle over the tension between what courts believe social science can do
and what they would like social science to offer means that the door is not
completely closed to building a stronger relationship between law and social
science. On the other hand, the door is barely open. Legal advocates,
amenable judges, and social scientists alike will have to continue fighting to
convince courts that social science research is a powerful tool to ensure equal
protection and civil rights while providing valuable information to
factfinders about the social phenomena that produce the discrimination and
disparities at the center of these cases.
21

564 U.S. at 354.
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Martin v. F.E. Moran, Inc. Fire Prot. of N. Ill., No. 13 C 3526, 2018 WL 1565597 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
30, 2018).
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This Symposium Issue proceeds in multiple parts. First, Reva Siegel’s
opening remarks lay the historical foundation for understanding how
McCleskey and its doctrinal progeny miss the mark on discriminatory
purpose.24 By locating McCleskey in the context of cases coming out of the
Burger and Rehnquist Supreme Courts that restricted proof of discriminatory
purpose to invidious discriminatory intent, we begin to understand the
treatment of statistical evidence that speaks more to patterns of disparity
rather than causal intent.
The first set of papers address questions of McCleskey’s legacy and
paths to overcoming the resistance to using social science evidence in a
variety of legal contexts. Mario Barnes and Erwin Chemerinsky discuss the
relationship between McCleskey and other major equal protection cases,
demonstrating that the Court has treated social science evidence in uneven
ways.25 They argue that the standards for evidence to show discrimination,
paired with inconsistencies in the courts’ treatments of social science
evidence, require a new approach for evaluating and applying social science
data on racial impacts in the courts. Aya Gruber argues that Justice Lewis
Powell’s “fear of too much justice”26 in McCleskey was driven more by his
fear of leniency than by an aversion to addressing racial disparities.27 Ifeoma
Ajunwa and Angela Onwuachi-Willig discuss how the use of racial impact
statements that mandate the consideration of statistical evidence of racial
impacts when enacting legislation could lead to reduced labor discrimination
against the formerly incarcerated, demonstrating the power of considering
the very types of evidence that McCleskey rejected.28 Michele Goodwin
draws attention to how gender discrimination informs lawmaking and
judicial decision-making in cases and legislation involving women’s
reproductive rights in the United States and abroad.29 Like Gruber, Goodwin
looks behind the curtain to highlight the ways that legal decisions are often
about more than meets the eye. Jonathan Feingold and Evelyn Carter argue
that the Supreme Court has not been as reluctant to use social science
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Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of
Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—And Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
1269 (2018).
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Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Brown Do for You? Addressing McCleskey v.
Kemp as a Flawed Standard for Measuring the Constitutionally Significant Risk of Race Bias, 112 NW.
U. L. REV. 1293 (2018).
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481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1337 (2018).
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Ifeoma Ajunwa & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Combating Discrimination Against the Formerly
Incarcerated in the Labor Market, 112 ˜NW. U. L. REV. 1385 (2018).
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Michele Goodwin, Challenging the Rhetorical Gag and TRAP: Reproductive Capacities, Rights,
and the Helms Amendment, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1417 (2018).
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evidence as some have argued, but that motivated reasoning causes them to
rely on it in some cases but not others.30
Next, Paul Butler offers his remarks on the legacy of McCleskey and
the impossible standards set for demonstrating racial discrimination.31 He
worries that the project of bringing social science to bear on questions of
equal protection and racial discrimination is doomed to fail if the takeaway
from discussions of McCleskey is that social science just needs to provide
more or better evidence of racial bias and discrimination in order to be
persuasive. Instead, he argues, a willingness to confront white supremacy is
needed.
The second set of papers give examples of social science research that
has been conducted to address questions of racial justice, including evidence
of the racially disparate impacts of doctrinal and policy changes. Osagie
Obasogie and Zachary Newman study how a doctrinal change by the
Supreme Court in cases involving claims of excessive police force
fundamentally changed the legal rhetoric around these claims in a way that
undermined the use of social science evidence of group-based and structural
racial disparities.32 Bernadette Atuahene studies how property tax policy in
Michigan disproportionately affected black homeowners, raising questions
about the legality of the policies under the Fair Housing Act.33 Russell
Robinson and David Frost return us to judicial “fear[s] of too much justice,”34
showing how the same fears motivating restraint in the application of social
science evidence by the courts on matters of race have similarly led to
restraint and narrow decisions in cases involving sexual orientation.35
Kyneshawau Hurd and Victoria Plaut discuss how legal actors have used
social science selectively to craft arguments about affirmative action that
emphasize the benefits for majority groups rather than relying on the
evidence of the impacts of discrimination and costs of lack of diversity for
historically excluded groups.36 They then present a study that shows the
30
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34
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35
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Undermine Inclusion?, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1605 (2018).
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consequences of this strategic policy framing, namely that majority groups
prefer policies that center the benefits of policies on them rather than
marginalized groups.
Finally, we close this Symposium Issue with the keynote address by
Jack Boger, who argued McCleskey before the Supreme Court.37 In his
remarks, he reflects on the momentum toward judicial acknowledgement of
racial disparities in capital sentencing that built during the 1960s. He
discusses how signals from the Warren Court encouraged the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund to gather empirical evidence of racial
discrimination in capital sentencing and to develop constitutional responses
to those racial disparities. Unfortunately, a shift in makeup of the Supreme
Court in 1969 and the aftermath of Furman v. Georgia38 in 1972, where the
Court expressed concerns about the capricious and arbitrary application of
the death penalty, soon dashed hopes of an easy path to addressing racial
disparities in death sentences through the use of social science evidence in
the courtroom. The Court came to believe that states’ revisions to their
capital punishment statutes sufficiently addressed the concerns expressed in
Furman. Even though Warren McCleskey offered the Court compelling
evidence to the contrary, the Court ultimately decided against him. Boger
leaves us with a call to action, encouraging social scientists and legal
scholars to continue their pursuit of evidence of patterns of racial
discrimination that remain widespread in the criminal justice system and
beyond. We echo this call.
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John Charles Boger, McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes from 1977–1991, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1637
(2018).
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408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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